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Abstract Subcontracting allows manufacturer agents to
reduce completion times of their jobs and thus obtain sav-
ings. This paper addresses the coordination of decentralized
scheduling systems with a single subcontractor and several
agents having divisible jobs. Assuming complete informa-
tion, we design parametric pricing schemes that strongly
coordinate this decentralized system, i.e., the agents’ choices
of subcontracting intervals always result in efficient sched-
ules. The subcontractor’s revenue under the pricing schemes
depends on a single parameter which can be chosen to make
the revenue as close to the total savings as required. Also, we
give a lower bound on the subcontractor’s revenue for any
coordinating pricing scheme. Allowing private information
about processing times, we prove that the pivotal mechanism
is coordinating, i.e., agents are better off by reporting their
true processing times, and by participating in the subcon-
tracting.We show that the subcontractor’smaximum revenue
with any coordinating mechanism under private information
equals the lower bound of that with coordinating pricing
schemes under complete information. Finally, we address
the asymmetric case where agents obtain savings at different
rates per unit reduction in completion times. We show that
coordinating pricing schemes do not always exist in this case.
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1 Introduction
As a common supply chain management practice, manufac-
turers take advantage of external resources to alleviate the
burden of internal operations through subcontracting and
outsourcing. While outsourcing externalizes some internal
operations, subcontracting allows manufacturers to carry out
jobs both internally and externally (Van Mieghem 1999).
In this manner, subcontracting enables a manufacturer to
speed up the completion times of his jobs. Instances of
subcontracting practices can be found in quick-response
industries characterized by volatile demand and inflexi-
ble capacities, e.g., metal fabrication industry (Parmigiani
2003), electronics assembly (Webster et al. 1997), high-tech
manufacturing (Aydinliyim and Vairaktarakis 2011), textile
production, and engineering services (Taymaz andKiliçaslan
2005).
Although a considerable number of papers in the literature
analyzes the subcontracting strategies in production planning
and scheduling problems of manufacturers (Kamien and Li
1990; Tan and Gershwin 2004; Chen and Li 2008; Lee and
Sung 2008), the subcontractors’ scheduling problems have
received less attention. In reality, a subcontractor by itself
faces a limited capacity while providing service to several
manufacturers. Given the time-sensitive nature of subcon-
tracting operations, the subcontractor’s schedule has critical
impact on the performance of manufacturers as well as the
supply chain. The lack of due attention to the subcontrac-
tors’ operations can cause significant complications in the
extended supply chain. A well-documented real-life exam-
ple of this issue has been reported in Boeing’s Dreamliner
supply chain where the overloaded schedules of subcontrac-
tors, each working with multiple suppliers, resulted in long
delays in the overall production due dates (see Vairaktarakis
(2013) and the references therein).
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An important feature of subcontractor’s scheduling prob-
lem is that the jobs belong to different manufacturers
who are concerned with the processing of their own jobs
only.
Unlike centralized systems where a single decision maker
controls all the relevant decision variables and possesses
all the necessary information, the agents in a decentralized
system have some control over their individual decisions
and/or are privately informed about some aspects of the
system. Therefore, in order for the system to achieve a
particular objective a mechanism is needed that motivates
the agents to make their decisions and reveal their private
information in a way that the system’s ultimate objective is
attained indirectly. In this paper, we focus on the efficiency
objective, that is, we are seeking mechanisms that result
in subcontracting schedules that maximize the total savings
obtained by all manufacturers. In other words, we address
the problem of coordination in decentralized subcontracting
systems.
The mechanisms considered in this paper are pricing and
payment schemes that the subcontractor announces before
the manufacturers choose their most desirable subcontract-
ing intervals. Such mechanisms are in fact common in
practice. An example is the online reservation system imple-
mented by the Semiconductor Product Analysis and Design
Enhancement (SPADE) center of the Hong Kong Univer-
sity of Science and Technology1 wherein the semiconductor
companies choose service time intervals in a first-come-first-
book manner and in consideration of an announced price list
for services in different time intervals.
Naturally, the design of mechanisms in the decentral-
ized subcontracting systems must consider the utility of
agents, i.e., savings due to subcontracting minus payments,
as well as the subcontractor’s revenue to ensure that all par-
ties are sufficientlymotivated to participate and operate in the
system.
In this paper,we study a subcontractor scheduling problem
with several manufacturer agents and a single subcontractor
that carries out the agents’ jobs on a single machine. Of par-
ticular interest to this paper is the scenario where a divisible
job can be processed simultaneously on the manufacturer’s
private machine as well as on the subcontractor’s machine.
The reduction in completion time of an agent’s job obtained
by such parallel processing providesmonetary saving for that
agent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
a review of related work. In Sects. 3 and 4, we assume
complete information and give pricing schemes that coor-
dinate the decentralized system. That is the pricing schemes
enforce a choice of subcontracting time intervals that coin-
cides with efficient allocations of the centralized solution
1 http://www.ust.hk/spade
for every agent. In particular, Sect. 3 characterizes efficient
allocations of the centralized solution. Section 4 provides
sufficient conditions for the existence of coordinating pric-
ing schemes and it introduces a family of pricing schemes
that are strongly coordinating. With a strongly coordinating
pricing scheme, the efficient allocations in the centralized
solutions are uniquely optimal for all agents. Moreover, we
show a lower bound on the total payments for any coor-
dinating pricing scheme. Finally we show that with the
appropriate choice of a single parameter, our proposed pric-
ing schemes enable the subcontractor to obtain a total revenue
anywhere between the lower bound and the maximum total
savings.
In Sect. 5, we allow the true processing time of each job
to be a private information of its agent and we address the
intricacies resulting from agents possibly lying by report-
ing false processing times in order to obtain their preferred
subcontracting intervals. In order to achieve efficiency, how-
ever, the subcontractor elicits the true processing times of
jobs using certain mechanism. We draw upon the class of
efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms and on the
pivotal mechanism (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves
1973) in particular. The underlying reason for this choice
is that the pivotal mechanism is the only efficient and
incentive compatible mechanism that always results in non-
negative payments from agents to the subcontractor. This
is a desirable property as agents must not be paid if their
jobs are processed by the subcontractor in the subcontrac-
tor scheduling problem. We obtain a simple closed-form
formula for the payments in the pivotal mechanism and
prove that the pivotal mechanism results in truth-telling
being the unique optimal choice of all agents except the
one scheduled last on the subcontractor’s machine who
can possibly exaggerate his processing time without affect-
ing anyone’s utility. This result is particularly interesting
as “uniqueness of equilibrium might be thought of as the
exception rather than the rule” (Jackson 2000). Since we
also show that the mechanism guarantees that all agents
are better off by subcontracting, we actually prove that the
pivotal mechanism coordinates the decentralized subcon-
tracting problem under private information. Finally, we show
that under any coordinating mechanism, the subcontractor’s
revenue is equivalent to the lower bound of that with the
coordinating pricing schemes. Therefore, coordinated sys-
tem under private information never generates higher total
revenue for the subcontractor than that under complete infor-
mation.
In Sect. 6, we address the asymmetric case where the
agents obtain savings at different rates. The efficient central-
ized allocations in this case are more difficult to characterize.
Moreover, we show that it is impossible to devise a coordinat-
ing pricing scheme in general for this case. Section 7 contains
the concluding remarks.
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2 Related work
Thedecentralized scheduling problemshave been considered
in cooperative and non-cooperative settings.
In the former, agents (jobs) are able to communicate and
coordinate strategies. The early work of Curiel et al. (1989)
studies the cost allocation problem in a cooperative game
based on the perennial scheduling problem of Smith (1956).
A survey of related research is given by Curiel et al. (2004).
In the non-cooperative settings agents choose their strate-
gies individually and in competition with other agents. This
paper falls in this category.
Heydenreich et al. (2007) provide an introduction to and a
literature review of problems arising in the non-cooperative
decentralized scheduling. One important problem pertains
to determining the equilibria of individual decisions and the
quality of the corresponding solution compared with that
of the centralized optimal solution. The pioneering work of
Koutsoupias andPapadimitriou (1999),which gave rise to the
literature on price of anarchy, analyzes the worst-case per-
formance of a decentralized scheduling system with parallel
machines in comparison with that in the centralized system.
As the outcomes of a decentralized system depend on the
“policies” employed to handle the agents, another impor-
tant problem addresses a better design of such policies. The
coordination mechanisms discussed by Christodoulou et al.
(2004) seek policies which improve the performance of a
decentralized parallel sequencing system—Immorlica et al.
(2005) review and extend this line of research. Ideally, such
policies could make the decentralized system as efficient as
the centralized system. Wellman et al. (2001) study pricing
schemes for a scheduling problem that could achieve this goal
and show that such pricing schemes might not exist in gen-
eral. Kutanoglu and Wu (1999) report similar non-existence
results for another scheduling problem. Even if the existence
of such pricing schemes could be proven, the problemof find-
ing the pricing scheme might be NP-hard (Chen et al. 2004).
Private information further complicates the coordination
problem. The well-known incentive compatible mechanisms
draw upon payment schemes to truthfully elicit the pri-
vate information of the agents. The Vickery–Clarke–Groves
(VCG) mechanisms (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves
1973) characterize all efficient mechanisms that make truth-
telling an undominated strategy of all agents. For single
machine sequencing, Suijs (1996) shows that there exists
no incentive compatible and individually rational mecha-
nism that results in the total payment of zero. Nisan and
Ronen (2007) propose payment schemes that guarantee a
certain performance for a decentralized scheduling problem
for which the payment schemes of VCG mechanisms are
NP-hard to compute.
The decentralized subcontracting and outsourcing prob-
lems have also been addressed in a number of papers.
Aydinliyim and Vairaktarakis (2010) study a cooperative
game where coalitions of agents reschedule their reserved
time intervals to obtain savings. They prove non-emptiness
of the core and the convexity of the corresponding game. Cai
and Vairaktarakis (2012) investigate a problem with over-
time and tardiness costs where the subcontractor announces
the prices of time intervals before agents book their most
preferred time intervals in a first-come-first-book manner.
They show the balancedness of the corresponding coopera-
tive game and implement the VCG mechanisms to elicit the
private information of agents. Bukchin and Hanany (2007)
compare the costs of a scheduling system comprised of mul-
tiple capacitated agents and an uncapacitated subcontractor
in decentralized and centralized systems. Qi (2012) investi-
gates a subcontractor’s pricing problem with a single agent
havingmultiple jobs which can be subcontracted (though not
partially) to reduce the tardiness costs.
The subcontracting problem related to the one addressed
in this paper was first studied by Vairaktarakis and Aydin-
liyim (2007) where they compare the performance in decen-
tralized and centralized settings. Building upon the same
model, Vairaktarakis (2013) analyzes the outcomes of a
decentralized subcontracting system under different proto-
cols announced by the subcontractor. However, both papers
assume complete information and neither provides coordi-
nating pricing schemes for the problem. The model consid-
ered in this paper generalizes the model of Vairaktarakis and
Aydinliyim (2007) by allowing an agent to usemore than one
interval on the subcontractor’s machine. This generalization
is critical for a coordinating pricing schemes which need to
give the agents freedom in choosing how many intervals on
the subcontractor’s machine to buy—the Vairaktarakis and
Aydinliyim (2007) model would a priori limit this choice to
at most a single interval which does not make their model
adequate for the study of pricing schemes.
It is worth noticing that the models in Vairaktarakis and
Aydinliyim (2007) and Vairaktarakis (2013) borrow from the
concept of divisible jobs introduced in the context of job
shops by Anderson (1981), and in the context of distributed
computer systems scheduling by Bharadwaj et al. (1996), see
also Drozdowski (2009) for a more recent review.
The distributed computer systems provide another impor-
tant application area for the results obtained in this paper,
where agents carry out their computations on their private
machines as well as buy computational time on shared CPUs
with available capacity.
3 The problem
Consider a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. At time t = 0, agent
i ∈ N has a divisible job with processing time pi > 0.
2 Let
2 We refer to i as a job or an agent depending on the context.
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p = (p1, . . . , pn) be the vector of processing times. We
assume, except in Sect. 5, that p is given. An agent i has its
own private machine to do its job in time pi , besides private
machines a subcontractor is available that can process any
portion of job i on itsmachine that can be shared by all agents.
Thus, by subcontracting, agent i can reduce the completion
time of its job to less than pi . Let Ti = ∪
mi
k=1T
k
i be the total
time allocated to agent i consisting of mi non-overlapping
subintervals T ki = [t
k
i , t
k
i + t¯
k
i ) where t
k
i ≥ 0 and t¯
k
i > 0 are
the start time and the duration of the kth subinterval, respec-
tively. The subintervals of agent i are indexed by the order
of their start times. An allocation T = {Ti |i ∈ N } is a set of
allocations Ti on subcontractor’s machine. Allocation T is
feasible if and only if for any i , j , k, and k′ the subintervals
[tki , t
k
i + t¯
k
i ) and [t
k′
j , t
k′
j + t¯
k′
j ) do not overlap. Let T denote
the set of all feasible allocations T for the agents in N .
Our model allows preemptions on subcontractor’s
machine, that is the portion of a job allocated to the sub-
contractor’s machine (or the subcontracted part of a job) is
allowed to be executed inmore than one disjoint time interval
on that machine. This renders our model to be more general
and arguably closer to real-life than the one in Vairaktarakis
and Aydinliyim (2007) where only at most one time interval
on subcontractor’s machine is allowed for any subcontracted
part. Consequently two main decisions need to be made for
each job in the model: one is the size of the subcontracted
part of a job (this part can be executed on the subcontractor’s
machine simultaneously with the remaining part of the job
executed on private machine—thus the term divisible jobs),
the other as to how to execute the subcontracted part (this part
can possibly be executed in several disjoint time intervals—
thus the term preemptions on the subcontractor’s machine).
The saving obtained by agent i from an allocation Ti is
calculated recursively as follows. Assume that initially, agent
i uses its private machine only in the interval [0, pi ], i ∈ N .
Take the earliest interval allocated to i , T 1i . If the start time
t1i < pi , then a portion of the remainder of job i done after
t1i , i.e., pi − t
1
i , on i’s private machine can be transferred
to the subcontractor. The most efficient way to do this is for
agent i to split the remainder equally between its private and
subcontractor’s machines, unless the duration of the interval
is too short (see Fig. 1). If the duration of the interval is too
short, i.e., t¯1i < (pi − t
1
i )/2, then T
1
i is fully utilized by i
on the subcontractor’s machine. Therefore, by utilizing the
allocated interval T 1i , agent i can reduce the finish time of its
job by an amount equal to
υi (T
1
i ) = max
{
min
{
pi − t
1
i
2
, t¯1i
}
, 0
}
.
Clearly, the allocation Ti cannot be utilized at all by agent
i if t1i ≥ pi . The saving obtained by the next interval can
be calculated in the same manner considering that the new
Fig. 1 Valuation in subcontracting
processing time of job i is pi−υi (T
1
i ) on i’s privatemachine.
Thus the saving due to the kth subinterval T ki to agent i is
obtained recursively by
υi (T
k
i ) = max
{
min
{
pi −
∑k−1
l=1 υi
(
T li
)
− tki
2
, t¯ki
}
, 0
}
(1)
total saving due to the allocation Ti is calculated by summing
up the savings obtained by all of its subintervals:
υi (Ti ) =
mi∑
k=1
υi
(
T ki
)
. (2)
If Ti = {[ti , t¯i )} is a single interval, theEq. (2) simplifies to
υi (Ti ) = max
{
min
{
(pi − ti ) /2, t¯i
}
, 0
}
. The total saving
of a feasible allocation T is the sum of savings of all agents,
that is υ(T ) =
∑
i∈N υi (Ti ).
3.1 Characterization of efficient (centralized)
allocations
The objective of the centralized problem is to find efficient
allocations on the subcontractor machine for N . An efficient
allocation T is a feasible allocation that maximizes the total
saving, that is
T ∈ argmax
T∈T
υ(T ). (3)
LetT = {Ti |i ∈ N } be an efficient allocation.We have the
following two simple observations that hold for any efficient
allocation.
Observation 1 For i ∈ N, job i does not finish on the sub-
contractor’s machine later than on agent’s i private machine.
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Observation 2 The subcontractor’s machine is never idle
when some agent’s private machine is busy.
We now prove that all efficient allocations are non-
preemptive.
Lemma 1 No efficient allocation on subcontractor’s
machine is preemptive.
Proof By contradiction. Let T be an efficient and preemp-
tive allocation and let n′ ≤ n be the number of agents with
allocations on the subcontractor’s machine. We show that
then there exists another feasible allocation with higher total
saving. Suppose that mi > 1 for some i ∈ N . Without
loss of generality we take the largest such i . Let T
m j
j =
[t
m j
j , t
m j
j + t¯
m j
j ) be the allocation immediately preceding
T
mi
i . We have i = j , and t
m j
j + t¯
m j
j = t
mi
i by Observa-
tion 2. Consider the following modification: [Step 1] delay
T
mi−1
i by t
mi
i − (t
mi−1
i + t¯
mi−1
i ); speed up all the alloca-
tions between T
mi−1
i and T
mi
i by t¯
mi−1
i . Thus job i would
be preempted one less time. By Observation 1 this mod-
ification does not change the completion time of any job.
Therefore, total saving remains unchanged. [Step 2] Increase
the duration of the last allocation of j by t¯
mi−1
i /2, so that by
Observation 1 the private machine of agent j finishes ear-
lier by t¯
mi−1
i /2. For k = i, . . . , n
′, i.e., jobs including and
after i , start the last allocation of k by t¯
mi−1
i /2
k−i+1 later
and finish it min
{
t¯
mi−1
i /2
k−i+2, t¯k
}
later on the subcontrac-
tor’s machine (observe that if t¯
mi−1
i /2
k−i+2 ≥ t¯k then k will
no longer be executed on the subcontractor’s machine) and
min
{
t¯
mi−1
i /2
k−i+2, t¯k
}
later on agent k private machine.
The resulting allocation is feasible. Furthermore, jobs in
N \ { j, i, . . . , n′} complete as before Step 2, and for the jobs
in { j, i, . . . , n′} the total saving increases by
t¯
mi−1
i
2
−
t¯
mi−1
i
4
− · · · −min
{
t¯
mi−1
i
2n
′−i+2
, t¯n′
}
≥
t¯
mi−1
i
2
−
t¯
mi−1
i
4
− · · · −
t¯
mi−1
i
2n
′−i+2
> 0.
Hence, the alternative allocation has a higher total saving
which contradicts the efficiency of T . ⊓⊔
The lemma excludes allocations with preemptions on sub-
contractor’s machine from the set of efficient allocations.
This result is key for our coordinating pricing scheme in
Sect. 4 since the efficient allocations with preemptions on
subcontractor’s machine could make the existence of coordi-
nating pricing scheme questionable or possiblymore difficult
to prove.
By Lemma 1, mi = 1 for i ∈ N in any efficient allocation
T that is Ti = [ti , ti + t¯i ) for i ∈ N . Vairaktarakis and
Aydinliyim (2007) observe that, for any efficient allocation
T with mi = 1, i ∈ N , each job finishes simultaneously on
its own private and subcontractor’s machines, that is
pi − t¯i = ti + t¯i for i ∈ N . (4)
They also show that for mi = 1, i ∈ N , the agents’ effi-
cient allocations Ti are ordered in non-decreasing order of
pi . Thus, we assume hereafter in this section and in Sect. 4
that N is arranged in the non-decreasing order of processing
times. In this manner, job i would be sequenced in i th posi-
tion on subcontractor’s machine. Finally, by Observation 2,
there is no idle time on the subcontractor machine in efficient
allocations, thus we have
t1 = 0 and ti = ti−1 + t¯i−1 for i > 1. (5)
The unique solution of the recursive equations (4) and (5)
is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Efficient allocation) (Vairaktarakis and Aydin-
liyim 2007) For efficient allocations with mi = 1 for i ∈ N,
we have
t¯i =
pi
2
−
i−1∑
k=1
t¯k
2
=
pi
2
−
i−1∑
k=1
pk
2i+1−k
. (6)
By this theorem
υi (T ) = υi (Ti ) = t¯i (7)
and thus, υ(T ) =
∑
i∈N t¯i . Equations (6) and (5) define
vectors of efficient durations t¯ = (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and start times
t = (t1, . . . , tn) on subcontractor’s machine. Finally, we let
tn+1 = tn + t¯n denote the completion time of the efficient
allocations, i.e., the makespan of efficient allocations.
Thoughmultiple efficient allocations exist as long as there
are jobs with equal processing times, in each one of them
the jobs in the same position on subcontractor’s machine
start at the same time and have the same efficient durations.
This observation is key to the coordinating pricing scheme
developed in the next section.
4 Strongly coordinating pricing schemes
In contrast to a centralized systemwhere allocations are cho-
sen for the agents so as to maximize the total saving, in a
decentralized system the decisions are made by the agents in
a distributed fashion. Though the agents are self-interested
they need, by definition of coordinating mechanism, to col-
lectively converge to an efficient allocation. The convergence
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502 J Sched (2015) 18:497–511
depends on amechanism used in the collective decisionmak-
ing. In this section we design such a mechanism based on a
pricing scheme. A pricing scheme is a function q, defined
on t ≥ 0, which determines a price q(t) ≥ 0 for acquiring
the time t on the subcontractor’s machine by any agent. The
mechanism based on a pricing scheme q works as follows.
The subcontractor announces its pricing scheme, and subse-
quently agent i buysTi in afirst-come-first-servemanner. The
agent makes its decision so as to maximize its utility, which
for a given q, and assuming quasilinear utilities, equals
u
q
i (Ti ) = υi (Ti )− π
q(Ti ), (8)
where
πq(Ti ) =
∫
t∈Ti
q(t)dt (9)
is the agent i’s payment for Ti made to the subcontractor. We
require q to be a locally integrable function so that (9) always
exists.
Though each agent maximizes its utility with respect to
q, the choice of q must ensure coordination in the decentral-
ized system. That is q must guarantee that the agents choose
their subcontracting intervals in the exact same manner as in
some efficient allocation T . We call such pricing schemes
coordinating. Let E be the set of all efficient allocations. We
formally define.
Definition 1 (Coordinating pricing scheme) The pricing
scheme q is coordinating if for any T = (T1, . . . , Tn),
T ∈ E , and any T = (T1, . . . , Tn), T ∈ T \ E ,
πq(Ti )− π
q(Ti ) ≤ υi (Ti )− υi (Ti ) (10)
for each i ∈ N .Thepricing schemeq is strongly coordinating
if (10) holds strictly for each i ∈ N .
A coordinating pricing scheme results in the situation where
no agent would be worse off by choosing an efficient alloca-
tion. However, the implementation of a coordinating pricing
scheme may not necessarily result in the efficiency of the
system. This is due to the possibility that an agent chooses
an interval which is not a part of any efficient allocation. Such
a choice could hinder forthcoming agents to select their effi-
cient allocations. Therefore, the strong coordination requires
all agents to exclusively choose efficient allocations.
A natural class of pricing schemes to consider for schedul-
ing consists of thosewith non-increasingq where agents have
to pay a higher price for earlier intervals. When the choice of
agent i consists of single interval only, i.e., Ti = [ti , ti + t¯i ),
we letπq(Ti ) = π
q(ti , ti + t¯i ).We now show that the class of
non-increasing pricing schemes contain coordinating pricing
schemes.
Theorem 2 (Sufficient conditions)A non-increasing pricing
scheme q is coordinating if q(0) < 1 and the following two
conditions are met:
C1. For any i = 2, . . . , n and every ǫ, 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i−1/2:
πq(ti − 2ǫ, ti )− π
q(ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1) ≥ ǫ; (11)
C2. For any i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and every ǫ, 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i/2,
and for i = n and every ǫ, 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯n:
πq(ti , ti + 2ǫ)− π
q(ti+1, ti+1 + ǫ) ≤ ǫ. (12)
Proof All T ∈ E define the same start times t = (t1, . . . , tn)
and durations t¯ = (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) as shown in the previous sec-
tion.
The individual rationality requires that for 0 ≤ t < tn+1,
q(t) must be less than 1, otherwise jobs would be either
better off by not selecting the time with subcontracting price
exceeding one or indifferent if the price equals one. Since q is
non-increasing, the individual rationality holds if q(0) < 1.
For q to be a coordinating pricing scheme, it must be
that no agent can deviate from an efficient allocation and
improve its utility. The first-come-first-booked order breaks
ties between jobs with equal processing times, if any, and
picks a unique efficient allocation T from E . In T agent i has
the utility υi (Ti ) − q(Ti ). The fact that ti + 2t¯i = pi and q
is non-increasing, implies that agent i cannot choose another
interval to increase its valuation and, at the same time, reduce
its payment. In order to improve its utility, the agent i may be
able to choose another interval to: (a) increase its valuation
as well as payment such that the added valuation is greater
than the additional payment, or (b) decrease its valuation as
well as payment such that the saving in payment is greater
than the reduction in valuation. We enforce conditions on q
such that neither (a) nor (b) could possibly happen for any
job.
(a) Suppose that the agent i chooses Ti in a way that
υi (Ti ) − υi (Ti ) = ǫ, for some ǫ > 0. Note that this is
not an option for i = 1. As q is non-increasing, Ti has the
cheapest payment if it starts as late as possible. Therefore,
Ti = [ti − 2ǫ, ti+1 − ǫ) is the cheapest alternative interval
for agent i which results in ǫ improvement in its valuation.
Note that i cannot have negative start time, thus ǫ ≤ ti/2.
From Definition 1 it follows that for the pricing scheme q to
be coordinating, it must hold for any i = 2, . . . , n and for
every 0 < ǫ ≤ ti/2 that
πq (ti − 2ǫ, ti+1 − ǫ)− π
q (ti , ti+1) ≥ ǫ.
By the definition of πq in (9), the last inequality can be
rewritten as (11) (see Fig. 2). We use induction and show
that the latter would be the case if for any i = 2, . . . , n, (11)
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Fig. 2 Non-increasing pricing schemes
holds for every 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i−1/2, i.e., the condition stated in
C1. This holds trivially for i = 2 as t2 = t¯1. Fix i = 3, . . . , n
and suppose that for j , 1 ≤ j < i , (11) holds for every ǫ
such that
0 < ǫ ≤
j∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2.
We show that (11) holds as well for every ǫ such that,
0 < ǫ ≤
j+1∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2.
Observe that this would be the case if for every ǫ′ such
that 0 < ǫ′ ≤ t¯i− j−1/2 we have,
πq
(
ti− j − 2ǫ
′, ti− j
)
− πq
⎛
⎝ti+1 − j∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2− ǫ
′, ti+1 −
j∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2
⎞
⎠ ≥ ǫ′.
(13)
As q is non-increasing, we have
πq
⎛
⎝ti+1 − j∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2− ǫ
′, ti+1 −
j∑
k=1
t¯i−k/2
⎞
⎠
≤ πq
(
ti− j+1 − ǫ
′, ti− j+1
)
Thus, (13) would be the case if for every ǫ′ such that
0 < ǫ′ ≤ t¯i− j−1/2 we have,
πq
(
ti− j − 2ǫ
′, ti− j
)
− πq
(
ti− j+1 − ǫ
′, ti− j+1
)
≥ ǫ′.
Condition C1 for the job i− j ensures that the latter holds.
Therefore, if for any i = 2, . . . , n, (11) holds (strictly) for
every 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i−1/2, then (11) holds (strictly) for every
0 < ǫ ≤ ti/2.
(b) It is straightforward to see that the interval which
reduces the valuation of the agent i by ǫ > 0,while having the
largest decrease in its payment, is Ti = (ti + 2ǫ, ti+1 + ǫ),
as long as ǫ ≤ t¯i . Therefore, for q to be coordinating it
must hold for every i = 1, . . . , n and for every ǫ such that
0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i that,
πq (ti , ti+1)− π
q (ti + 2ǫ, ti+1 + ǫ) ≤ ǫ.
By the definition of πq in (9), the last inequality can be
rewritten as (12). We use induction to show that for i =
1, . . . , n − 1 the latter would be the case if (11) holds for
every 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i/2, i.e., the condition stated in C2. Fix
i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and suppose that for j , 1 ≤ j < i , (12)
holds for every ǫ such that,
0 < ǫ ≤ min
⎧⎨
⎩
j∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2, t¯i
⎫⎬
⎭ .
We show that (12) holds as well for every ǫ such that,
0 < ǫ ≤ min
⎧⎨
⎩
j+1∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2, t¯i
⎫⎬
⎭ .
In case
∑ j
k=1 t¯i+k−1/2 < t¯i , observe that the latter would
hold if for every 0 < ǫ′ ≤ min
{
t¯i+ j/2, t¯i
}
we have,
πq
(
ti+ j , ti+ j + 2ǫ
′
)
− πq
⎛
⎝ti+1+ j∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2, ti+1 +
j∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2+ ǫ
′
⎞
⎠
≤ ǫ′. (14)
As q is non-increasing, we have
πq
⎛
⎝ti+1 + j∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2, ti+1 +
j∑
k=1
t¯i+k−1/2+ ǫ
′
⎞
⎠
≥ πq
(
ti+ j+1, ti+ j+1 + ǫ
′
)
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Thus, (14) would be the case if for every ǫ′ such that
0 < ǫ′ ≤ min
{
t¯i+ j/2, t¯i
}
we have
πq
(
ti+ j , ti+ j + 2ǫ
′
)
− πq
(
ti+ j+1, ti+ j+1 + ǫ
′
)
≤ ǫ′.
Condition C2 for the job i+ j ensures that the latter holds.
Therefore, if for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, (12) holds (strictly) for
every 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i/2, then (12) holds (strictly) for every
0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i . ⊓⊔
The conditions in Theorem 2 are designed to make the
deviations from t = (t1, . . . , tn) undesirable for all agents in
the sense that the agent’s utilities would be reduced if they
choose any intervals other than those defined by t. Clearly
with quasilinear utilities any agent can increase its utility
either by choosing an interval that either increases its valua-
tion (saving due to reduction in completion time) or reduces
its payment (see Fig. 2). With a non-increasing pricing
scheme attaining both of these at the same time is impos-
sible. Therefore, a deviation which increases (decreases) an
agent’s valuation, simultaneously increases (decreases) its
payment.
Only strongly coordinating pricing schemes can guarantee
efficient schedules in the decentralized system. In order to
introduce a family of strongly coordinating pricing schemes,
we need the following technical lemma which states that the
efficient duration of any job on subcontractor’smachine is not
longer than twice the efficient duration of the job proceeding
it.
Lemma 2 For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, t¯i ≤ 2t¯i+1.
Proof From (6) we get
t¯i − 2t¯i+1 =
pi
2
−
i−1∑
k=1
t¯k
2
− pi+1
+
i−1∑
k=1
t¯k +
(
pi
2
−
i−1∑
k=1
t¯k
2
)
= pi − pi+1.
The agents in N are sequence according to non-decreasing
order of processing times, thus we have pi ≤ pi+1 which
obtains t¯i ≤ 2t¯i+1. ⊓⊔
Note that in Lemma 2, the equality holds for jobs with
equal processing times. More precisely, pi = pi+1 if and
only if t¯i = 2t¯i+1.
We are now ready to give a family of non-increasing
pricing schemes that are strongly coordinating, that is, any
deviation from efficient allocation by any agent results in
utility loss for that agent.
Theorem 3 Consider the coefficient set κ = {κ1, . . . , κn}
such that for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, 0 < κi < κi+1/2 and 0 <
κn ≤ 2
n−1δ/3where 0 < δ ≤ 3/2n+1. The following pricing
scheme is strongly coordinating:
qO(t)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1− 2i−1δ
+κi
[
1− 2(t − ti )/t¯i
]
if ti ≤ t < ti + t¯i , i ∈ N
1− 2n−1δ − κn if t ≥ tn + t¯n
(15)
Proof The assumptions on κ ensure that: (a) qO is non-
increasing, (b) qO(0) < 1, and (c) qO(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0.
To verify (a), it suffices to consider the points of (possible)
discontinuity, i.e., t = ti+1 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. There, it
must hold that 1− 2i−1δ − κi ≥ 1− 2
iδ + κi+1 or
κi + κi+1 ≤ 2
i−1δ. (16)
By extending the assumption κi < κi+1/2 we get
κi < κn/2
n−i (17)
for i = 1, . . . , n−1. Thus, κi +κi+1 < 3κn/2
n−i . It follows
that for (16) to hold, we need
κn ≤ 2
n−1δ/3. (18)
In order for (b) to hold we must have 1 − δ + κ1 < 1
or κ1 < δ. Note that (17) and (18) yield κi < 2
i−1δ/3 for
i = 1, . . . , n − 1 which implies that κ1 < δ/3. Thus (b)
holds.
Given that qO is non-increasing, to verify (c) we must
check the non-negativity of qO(t) at t ≥ tn + t¯n . Note that
from (17) we get
1− 2n−1δ − κn ≥ 1− 2
n−1δ − 2n−1δ/3.
Hence, for (c) to hold we need δ ≤ 3/2n+1.
We now check the conditions in Theorem 2. Observe that
qO is piecewise linear and has a constant slope in between
any consecutive points of possible discontinuity.
With regard to condition C1, note that for 0 < ǫ ≤
t¯i−1/2 both π
qO (ti − 2ǫ, ti ) and π
qO (ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1) can
be obtained by calculating the areas of the corresponding
trapezoids. Let t− = limǫ→0+(t − ǫ). For any i = 2, . . . , n
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we have
πqO (ti − 2ǫ, ti )− π
qO (ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1)
=
1
2
2ǫ
[
qO (ti − 2ǫ)+ qO
(
t
−
i
)]
−
1
2
ǫ
[
qO (ti+1 − ǫ)+ qO
(
t
−
i+1
)]
=
1
2
2ǫ
[
1−2i−2δ−κi−1
(
1−
4ǫ
t¯i−1
)
+1−2i−2δ−κi−1
]
−
1
2
ǫ
[
1− 2i−1δ − κi
(
1−
2ǫ
t¯i
)
+ 1− 2i−1δ − κi
]
= ǫ
[
1− 2κi−1
(
1−
2ǫ
t¯i−1
)
+ κi
(
1−
ǫ
t¯i
)]
.
FromLemma 2we know that t¯i−1 ≤ 2t¯i and consequently
1− 2ǫ/t¯i−1 ≤ 1− ǫ/t¯i . By assumption we have 2κi−1 < κi
which leads to the observation that for every 0 < ǫ < t¯i−1/2,
πqO (ti − 2ǫ, ti )− π
qO (ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1) > ǫ (19)
with regard to ǫ = t¯i−1/2 we consider two cases. If t¯i−1/2 =
t¯i then at ǫ = t¯i−1/2, (19) holds strictly aswellwhich implies
that (19) holds strictly for every 0 < ǫ ≤ ti . Otherwise, if
t¯i−1/2 = t¯i , then at ǫ = t¯i−1/2, (19) holds as equality.
However, this requires that pi−1 = pi which corresponds to
an alternative efficient allocation wherein job i is allocated
with the interval allocated to job i − 1. Hence, the choice of
any earlier intervals for a given agent i which is not part of
an efficient allocation results in loss of utility for that agent.
Also, for jobs with equal processing times the choice of an
earlier alternative efficient intervals does not alter the utility
to the corresponding agents.
With regard to condition C2, note that for 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯i/2
both πqO (ti , ti + 2ǫ) and π
qO (ti+1, ti+1 + ǫ) can also be
obtained by calculating the areas of the corresponding trape-
zoids. for any i = 1, . . . , n − 1 we have
πqO (ti , ti + 2ǫ)− π
qO (ti+1, ti+1 + ǫ)
=
1
2
2ǫ [qO (ti )+ qO (ti + 2ǫ)]
−
1
2
ǫ
[
qO (ti+1)+ qO (ti+1 + ǫ)
]
=
1
2
2ǫ
[
1− 2i−1δ + κi + 1− 2
i−1δ + κi
(
1−
4ǫ
t¯i
)]
−
1
2
ǫ
[
1− 2iδ + κi+1 + 1− 2
iδ + κi+1
(
1−
2ǫ
t¯i+1
)]
= ǫ
[
1+ 2κi
(
1−
2ǫ
t¯i
)
− κi+1
(
1−
ǫ
t¯i+1
)]
.
FromLemma 2we know that t¯i ≤ 2t¯i+1 and consequently
1−2ǫ/t¯i ≤ 1−ǫ/t¯i+1.By assumptionwe have κi < κi+1/2.
Therefore, for 0 < ǫ < t¯i−1/2 we would have
πqO (ti , ti + 2ǫ)− π
qO (ti+1, ti+1 + ǫ) < ǫ (20)
If t¯i/2 = t¯i+1 then the latter also holds for ǫ = t¯i/2. In
case of t¯i/2 = t¯i+1, (20) would hold as equality for ǫ =
t¯i/2. However, this requires pi = pi+1 which implies the
existence of an alternative efficient allocation. Hence, the
choice of any later intervals for a given agent i which is not
part of an efficient allocation results in the loss of utility for
that agent. Also, for jobs with equal processing times the
choice of a later alternative efficient intervals does not alter
the utility to the corresponding agents.
Considering the above,we conclude thatqO is a coordinat-
ing pricing schemewhere for any T ∈ E and every T ∈ T\E ,
it holds for all i ∈ N thatπq(Ti )−π
q(Ti ) < υi (Ti )−υi (Ti ).
⊓⊔
To see how the pricing scheme introduced in Theorem 3
can coordinate the subcontractor scheduling problem first
note that for all agents with unequal processing times, corre-
sponding efficient allocations are exclusively the best choices
of subcontracting intervals. For agents with equal processing
time jobs, however, the best choices are multiple. Neverthe-
less, qO would result in the situation where the number of
best choices for the jobs with equal processing times are
exactly the same as the number of those jobs. Therefore, a
first-come-first-serve rule would result in strict coordination
of individual choices.
4.1 Subcontractor’s revenue with coordinating pricing
schemes
Let Πq =
∑
i∈N π
q(Ti ) be the total payment from agents
to the subcontractor under the pricing schemes q. We call
Πq the subcontractor’s revenue under q. In this section we
characterize the range of Πq with q being a coordinating
pricing scheme.
The coordinating pricing schemes introduced in Theo-
rem 3 can extract (almost) all of the total saving υ(T ) from
the agents by selecting δ small enough which is shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 ΠqO = υ(T )− δ
∑
i∈N 2
i−1 t¯i .
Proof For every i ∈ N we have,
πqO (Ti ) = t¯i
(
1− 2i−1δ + κi + 1− 2
i−1δ + κi − 2κi
)
/2
= t¯i
(
1− 2i−1δ
)
.
Therefore ΠqO =
∑
i∈N t¯i − δ
∑
i∈N 2
i−1 t¯i . ⊓⊔
Hence, the total payments can be made arbitrary close to
the maximum possible which is the total saving υ(T ).
We now provide a lower bound for the total subcon-
tractor’s revenue attainable under any coordinating pricing
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scheme. We show in Corollary 1 that this bound is an upper
bound on the subcontractor’s revenue attainable by any coor-
dinating mechanism with private information.
Theorem 5 (Lower bound) For any coordinating pricing
scheme q, we have Πq ≥
∑
i∈N t¯i
(
1− 1/2n−i
)
.
Proof Let T ∈ E be an efficient allocation. If q is coordinat-
ing, then for all i ∈ N there is no Ti which results in higher
utility than Ti . In particular, for any agent i = 2, . . . , n, the
following deviation from efficient allocation should not be
profitable: construct Ti by removing the last ǫ > 0 interval
at the end of Ti and add instead another interval with dura-
tion 2ǫ starting at time ti −2ǫ (to have feasible allocations it
must be that ǫ ≤ ti/2). With the new allocation, i finishes ǫ
units of time earlier, i.e., υi (Ti )−υi (Ti ) = −ǫ. To make this
deviation unprofitable, the condition in (10) requires that
πq (ti − 2ǫ, ti )− π
q (ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1) ≥ ǫ. (21)
We construct a pricing scheme qL which satisfies the
above condition for every i = 2, . . . , n and every 0 < ǫ ≤
ti/2, and has the lowest possible total revenue.
Let qL(t) = 0 for t ≥ tn . Observe that in the latter range
qL has the lowest possible prices, so under qL the agent n
pays 0 for its efficient allocation. The condition in (21) for
i = n and any 0 < ǫ ≤ tn/2 requires that
πqL (tn − 2ǫ, tn) ≥ ǫ. (22)
To obtain the cheapest pricing scheme we require qL to
yield πqL (tn − 2ǫ, tn) = ǫ for every 0 < ǫ ≤ t¯n−1/2. In
particular for ǫ = t¯n−1/2 we get π
qL (tn−1, tn) = t¯n−1/2.
This means that under qL the agent i = n − 1 pays t¯n−1/2.
Next, the condition (21) for agent i = n − 1 and every
0 < ǫ ≤ tn−1/2 requires that
πqL (tn−1 − 2ǫ, tn−1)− π
qL (tn − ǫ, tn) ≥ ǫ. (23)
To obtain the cheapest pricing scheme we can consider
qL to be such that (23) holds as equality for every 0 < ǫ ≤
t¯n−2/2. In this case, for ǫ = t¯n−2/2 we get
πqL (tn−2, tn−1)− π
qL
(
tn − t¯n−2/2, tn
)
= t¯n−2/2. (24)
By Lemma 2, we know that t¯n−2/2 ≤ t¯n−1 so tn −
t¯n−2/2 ≥ tn−1. Hence we have π
qL
(
tn − t¯n−2/2, tn
)
=
t¯n−2/4 and eventually
πqL (tn−2, tn−1) = 3t¯n−2/4. (25)
The latter implies that agent i = n − 2 under qL pays
t¯n−2(3/4) to the subcontractor.
By induction on i it is easily verifiable that under the
pricing scheme that satisfies the condition (21) and has the
lowest possible price, every agent i ∈ N pays an amount
equal to t¯i (1− 1/2
n−i ) to the subcontractor. Thus for every
coordinating pricing scheme q, it must be the case that
Πq ≥
∑
i∈N t¯i
(
1− 1/2n−i
)
. ⊓⊔
We close with the observation that the lower bound in
Theorem 5 is attainable by the following pricing scheme
qL(t) =
{
1− 1/2n−i if ti ≤ t < ti+1, i ∈ N ;
0 if t ≥ tn .
(26)
Clearly qL is non-increasing, and coordinating. To see the
latter we check the conditions in Theorem 2: C1 holds since
we have
(
1− 1/2n−i+1
)
2ǫ −
(
1− 1/2n−i
)
ǫ = ǫ. Also,
we have
(
1− 1/2n−i
)
2ǫ −
(
1− 1/2n−i−1
)
ǫ = ǫ. Thus C2
holds as (0) 2ǫ − (0) ǫ ≤ ǫ. Clearly, qL(0) < 1.
Finally we get ΠqL (T ) =
∑
i∈N t¯i
(
1− 1/2n−i
)
.
5 Private processing times
Section 4 shows how to coordinate a set of self-interested
agents through a coordinating pricing scheme under the
assumption that the vector of true processing times p is
given and known to the subcontractor. In this section, we
relax this assumption by allowing true processing times to
be private information of agents. Thus reporting an untruth-
ful processing time by an agent can deceive the subcontractor
who consequently moves the agent’s job in the sequence of
jobs in efficient allocations which can potentially increase
the agent’s time saving or reduce his payment.
This section presents amechanism that guarantees that the
agents are always better off by reporting their true process-
ing times, and that they are also better off by participating
in the subcontracting—such mechanism is refereed to as the
coordinating mechanism for the subcontractor scheduling
problem under private information. Finally, the section cal-
culates the amount the subcontractor forfeits to the agents to
extract the true processing times from them.
We draw upon mechanism design theory (Nisan 2007;
Jackson 2000) and introduce a payment scheme that moti-
vates agents to report true processing times knowing the
subcontractor’s intention to maximize the total savings.
A pricing scheme in Sect. 4 determines payments made by
agents to the subcontractor for time intervals that they choose
to utilize on the subcontractor’s machine. In this section the
payments are made for reporting particular processing times
by the agents to the subcontractor. Formally, each agent
reports a processing time ri from its individual processing
time space Pi ⊂ R+. We use pi to denote the true process-
ing time of agent i . Let P = P1×· · ·× Pn be the processing
time space of all agents.
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Definition 2 A mechanism M is defined by a (n + 1)-tuple
( f M , πM1 , . . . , π
M
n ) consisting of an allocation function
f M : P → T , and a payment scheme πM : P → Rn .
Given a vector of reported processing times r and the
sequence in which the agents report them (to break ties in
the allocation), the payment scheme of a mechanism deter-
mines the monetary amount πMi (r) that i ∈ N pays in return
for receiving the allocation prescribed for i by f M .
With quasilinear utilities, a mechanism M would result in
the utility
uMi
(
f M (r)
)
= υi
(
f M (r)
)
− πMi (r) (27)
for i ∈ N .
The subcontractor is seeking to allocate the subcontracting
intervals efficiently, thus we focus on mechanisms whose
allocation functions yield efficient allocations, i.e., f M ≡ T .
We call such mechanisms efficient.
We concentrate on incentive compatible mechanism since
they have the potential to motivate the agents to report their
true processing times.
Definition 3 Amechanism M is incentive compatible if for
every reported processing time vector r = (r1, . . . , rn) and
for every agent i ∈ N
uMi
(
f M
(
pi , r
−i
))
≥ uMi
(
f M (r)
)
, (28)
where r−i is the vector r without its i th coordinate.
Although incentive compatibility implies that agents are
not better off by lying about their true processing times,
it does not generally imply that the agents are better off
by reporting their true processing times—there could gen-
erally exist untruthful agent reports that result in the same
utility as the truthful ones. Therefore, unfortunately, agents
may generally choose to be untruthful after all even with
the incentive compatible mechanisms. This is generally the
case for VCG mechanisms, in particular the pivotal mecha-
nism, which characterize the class of efficient and incentive
compatible mechanisms for quasilinear utilities (Green and
Laffont 1977). However, we show later in Theorem 6 that for
the subcontractor scheduling problem studied in this paper
the pivotal mechanism makes the agents always better off by
reporting their true processing times.
5.1 Payment scheme
We draw upon the VCG mechanisms to obtain a desirable
payment scheme for the subcontractor scheduling problem.
The payment scheme for VCG mechanisms is defined as
follows
πVCGi (r) = hi
(
r−i
)
−
∑
j∈N\{i}
υ j (T (r)) ,
where hi is a function independent of agent i’s reported
processing time ri . Among the class of VCG mechanisms,
the pivotal mechanism with
hi
(
r−i
)
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
υ j
(
T
(
r−i
))
(29)
guarantees that all payments from the agents to the mecha-
nism are non-negative. Here T (r−i ) is an efficient allocation
for the set of jobs excluding job i and for processing time
vector r . Thus, the payment by pivotal mechanism for i ∈ N
equals
π P Mi (r) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
[
t¯ j
(
r−i
)
− t¯ j (r)
]
, (30)
where t¯ j (r) is the duration of subcontracting time allocated
to j by the efficient (optimal) allocation for the reported r and
t¯ j (r
−i ) is the duration of subcontracting time allocated to j
by the efficient allocation for the reported r−i that excludes
i .
By (30) the paymentπ P Mi (r) charged by the pivotalmech-
anism to agent i is the total subcontracting time that could
have been allocated to all other agents had not i asked for
subcontracting and reported ri . It follows from the charac-
terization of efficient solutions that the exclusion of an agent
i reporting ri would only affect the agents that follow i in
T (r). Let σ be the permutation of jobs in T (r) and let [i],
for i ∈ N , be the position of i in T (r).
Lemma 3 For all i ∈ N, we have
π P Mi (r) = t¯i (r)
(
1− 1/2n−[i]
)
. (31)
Proof We start by showing that for any i, j ∈ N , we have
t¯ j (r
−i ) − t¯ j (r) = 0 if [ j] < [i] and t¯ j (r
−i ) − t¯ j (r) =
t¯i (r)/2
[ j]−[i] if [ j] > [i].
By (6) ri does not appear in t¯ j (r) for [ j] < [i]. Therefore,
t¯ j (r
−i )− t¯ j (r) = 0 for [ j] < [i].
If [ j] > [i], then the exclusion of i affects the duration of
allocated time to jobs j without altering the relative position
of other jobs. By (4) and (5), we have
t¯ j (r) =
1
2
⎛
⎝r j −
⎡
⎣ti (r)+ t¯i (r)+ ∑
[i]<[k]<[ j]
t¯k(r)
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
and
t¯ j
(
r−i
)
=
1
2
⎛
⎝r j −
⎡
⎣ti (r)+ ∑
[i]<[k]<[ j]
t¯k
(
r−i
)⎤⎦
⎞
⎠
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Thus
t¯ j
(
r−i
)
− t¯ j (r)
=
1
2
⎛
⎝t¯i (r)− ∑
[i]<[k]<[ j]
[
t¯k
(
r−i
)
− t¯k(r)
]⎞⎠
By induction on [ j] − [i] we obtain t¯ j (r
−i ) − t¯ j (r)
= t¯i (r)/2
[ j]−[i] if [ j] > [i].
Based on the above observation, the total payment in (30)
becomes
π P Mi (r) =
∑
[k]>[i]
t¯i (r)/2
[k]−[i]
= t¯i (r)
∑
[k]>[i]
1/2[k]−[i]
= t¯i (r)
(
1− 1/2n−[i]
)
.
⊓⊔
5.2 Coordinating meachanism
Lemma 3 provides a closed-form formula for the pivotal
mechanism payments. With these payments, each agent pays
an amount directly proportional to the duration of its alloca-
tion on subcontractor’smachine and inversely proportional to
its order in the sequence of jobs on subcontractor’s machine.
Therefore if an agent announces a shorter than true process-
ing time, which could possibly precipitate its position in the
sequence and thus result in the agent’s higher time saving,
then the agent pays more. We show that as a result of this
misrepresentation, the agent’s utility decreases. At the same
time, we show that reporting longer than true processing time
reduces agent’s utility as well, unless the agent comes in the
last position in the sequence. This position is special since it
neither incurs any payment by (31) nor it affects any other
agent. Therefore, whether the agent in this position lies or not
is irrelevant. Alternatively, one can assume that the longest
job always belongs to the subcontractor—this dummy job
could represent the continuation of subcontractor’s opera-
tions. Consequently, themechanism enforces agents to report
their actual processing time which we now formally prove.
Theorem 6 Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) be the reported processing
times and let pi be true processing time of agent i . Then
u P Mi (T (pi , r
−i )) > u P Mi (T (r)), provided that pi = ri and
i is not in the last position of T (r).
Proof Assume pi = ri ∈ Pi for some agent i . Let p =
(pi , r−i ). Suppose job i is in position h and l in efficient
solutions T (p) and T (r), respectively, and assume l = n.
By (27), (31), (7), and (4), for pi , the utility of agent i is
u P Mi (T (p)) =
pi − ti (p)
2
−
pi − ti (p)
2
(
1−
1
2n−h
)
=
pi − ti (p)
2
1
2n−h
. (32)
There are two cases for ri : (a) ri > pi , and (b) ri < pi .
(a) With ri > pi we have
u P Mi (T (r)) =max
{
pi − ti (r)
2
, 0
}
−
ri − ti (r)
2
(
1−
1
2n−l
)
, (33)
where n > l ≥ h and ti (r) is the start time of job i in T (r).
Suppose l = h. In this case we have ti (r) = ti (p).
Since h < n, it directly follows from (32) and (33) that
u P Mi (T (r)) < u
P M
i (T (p)).
Next, suppose l > h. Let σ(k) be the job in position k in
T (p). By (4) and (5) and induction on l − h we have,
ti (r) = ti (p)+
l∑
k=h+1
rσ(k) − ti (p)
2l+1−k
=
rσ(l)
2
+ · · · +
rσ(h+1)
2l−h
+
ti (p)
2l−h
Using the fact that rσ(k) ≥ pi for k ≥ h we get
ti (r) ≥
l∑
k=h+1
pi
2l+1−k
+
ti (p)
2l−h
= pi −
pi
2l−h
+
ti (p)
2l−h
(34)
For a contradiction assume u P Mi (T (r)) ≥ u
P M
i (T (p)),
i.e., by (32) and (33) assume that
max
{
pi − ti (r)
2
, 0
}
−
ri − ti (r)
2
(
1−
1
2n−l
)
≥
pi − ti (p)
2
1
2n−h
.
If pi − ti (r) ≤ 0, then the contradiction readily follows.
Otherwise, suppose pi − ti (r) > 0. Then, we have
pi − ti (r)
2
−
ri − ti (r)
2
(
1−
1
2n−l
)
≥
pi − ti (p)
2
1
2n−h
.
The last inequality simplifies to
2l−h [ri − ti (r)]− [pi − ti (p)] ≥ 2
n−h [ri − pi ] .
Using (34), note that the last inequality remains valid
if ti (r) is replaced with pi − pi/2
l−h + ti (p)/2
l−h . The
inequality then simplifies to 2l−h [ri − pi ] ≥ 2
n−h [ri − pi ].
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This is a contradiction since we have 2l−h < 2n−h . Thus
u P Mi (T (r)) < u
P M
i (T (p)) for ri > pi .
(b) With ri < pi we have
u P Mi (T (r)) =
ri − ti (r)
2
−
ri − ti (r)
2
(
1−
1
2n−l
)
=
ri − ti (r)
2
1
2n−l
, (35)
where 1 ≤ l ≤ h.
Suppose h = l. Thenwe have ti (r) = ti (p), and it follows
from (32) and (35) that u P Mi (T (r)) < u
P M
i (T (p)).
Next, suppose 1 ≤ l < h. By (4) and (5) and induction on
h − l
ti (p) = ti (r)+
h−1∑
k=l
rσ(k) − ti (r)
2h−k
=
rσ(h−1)
2
+ · · · +
rσ(l)
2h−l
+
ti (r)
2h−l
.
Using the fact that rσ(k) ≤ pi for k ≤ h we get
ti (p) ≤
h−1∑
k=1
pi
2h−k
+
ti (r)
2h−l
= pi −
pi
2h−l
+
ti (r)
2h−l
(36)
For a contradiction assume u P Mi (T (r)) ≥ u
P M
i (T (p))
or, by (32) and (35),
ri − ti (r)
2
1
2n−l
≥
pi − ti (p)
2
1
2n−h
.
The last simplifies to
ri − ti (r) ≥ 2
h−l [pi − ti (p)].
Using (36), the last inequality remains valid if ti (p) is
replaced with pi − pi/2
h−l + ti (r)/2
h−l . The inequality
then simplifies to ri ≥ pi which is a contradiction. Thus
u P Mi (T (r)) < u
P M
i (T (p)) for ri < pi . ⊓⊔
Finally, to ensure agents’ participation in subcontracting,
the efficient mechanism M must satisfy the strict indi-
vidual rationality condition requiring that for all agents,
truth-telling results in positive utility, irrespective of the
reported processing times of other agents. That is, for every
r = (r1, . . . , ri = pi , . . . , rn) and all i ∈ N , u
M
i (T (r)) > 0.
The efficient mechanism (T , π P M ) satisfies the strict indi-
vidual rationality condition since, by (27), (31) and (7), we
have u P Mi (T (r)) = t¯i (r)/2
n−[i] > 0, for ri = pi .
Thus we showed the mechanism (T , π P M ) guarantees,
by Theorem 6, that the agents are always better off by
reporting their true processing times, and that, by strict indi-
vidual rationality, they are better off by participating in the
subcontracting. Therefore the mechanism coordinates the
subcontractor scheduling problemunder private information.
One possible disadvantage of coordination based on
mechanism design, the VCG mechanisms in particular, is
that this coordination is implicitly centralized—the efficient
schedule is computed by the subcontractor and then reported
to the agents. Although distributed implementations of the
pivotal mechanism where the schedule is determined by the
self-interested agents themselves are beyond the scope of this
paper, we refer the reader to Parkes and Shneidman (2004)
where guidelines for the distributed implementations of the
VCG mechanisms are proposed.
5.3 Subcontractor’s revenue with coordinating
mechanisms
The payment scheme π P M provides the subcontractor with
a positive revenue for any given r . Let us define Π P M (r) =∑
i∈N π
P M
i (r) as the total payment from agents to the sub-
contractor in pivotal mechanism. By Theorem 6 all agents
except the last in T (r) report their true processing times
while the last one pays nothing to the subcontractor regard-
less of his report. Therefore, we focus on the subcontractor’s
revenue for the true processing times p.
Although the subcontractor’s services result in the total
savings of υ(T (p)) for all agents, it follows from Lemma 3
that the mechanism (T , π P M ) can only achieve revenue
Π P M (p) for the subcontractor which is always less than
v(T (p)). In fact, instances can be found for which the ratio
of subcontractor’s revenue to total savings obtained via sub-
contracting, i.e., Π P M (p)/υ(T (p)), is arbitrarily close to
zero. For example, consider a set of two jobs with p1 = 2
and p2 = 101. Despite having a total saving of 51, we
have π P M1 = 0.5 and π
P M
2 = 0 resulting in the ratio
υ(T (p))/Π P M (p) < 0.01.
Nevertheless, Moulin (1986) shows that if for all agents
it holds that minT υi (T ) = 0—which is the case in subcon-
tractor’s subcontracting problem with divisible jobs—then
among all efficient, incentive compatible, and individually
rational mechanisms, the pivotal mechanism generates the
highest total payment. Therefore, the subcontractor cannot
gain a higher revenue from any other efficient, incentive com-
patible, and individually rational mechanisms than it does
from (T , π P M ). Thus, by the juxtaposition of Lemma 3 and
Theorem 5 we get the following observation.
Corollary 1 Subcontractor’s revenue with any efficient,
incentive compatible, and individually rational mechanisms
under private information never exceeds that with a coordi-
nating pricing scheme under complete information.
However, the construction of a coordinating pricing
scheme q requires the knowledge of true processing times
p, thus the differenceΠq(p)−Π P M (p)may be considered
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as the amount the subcontractor forfeit to the agents to extract
the true processing times from them.
6 Asymmetric valuations
We now relax the assumption of symmetric valuations and
assume that the value of a unit time saving for agent i is wi .
Let w = (wi |i ∈ N ). The saving to agent i resulting from
the allocation T thus equals
υwi (T ) = wiυi (T ). (37)
The total saving for all agents is defined as the sum of indi-
vidual savings, that is υw(T ) =
∑
i∈N υ
w
i (T ). The efficient
allocation is T = argmaxT υ
w(T ). Unlike the symmetric
case where each job in N is allocated a non-empty inter-
val on subcontractor’s machine, in asymmetric case efficient
allocations may exclude some jobs from the subcontractor’s
schedule. Let I = {i ∈ N |t¯i > 0} be the set of jobs that
receive non-empty allocations, and O = {i ∈ N |t¯i = 0} the
set of jobs that receive no such allocations. We denote the
cardinality of I with l.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on coordinating
pricing schemes in situations with asymmetric valuations. In
these situations, any coordinating pricing scheme q meets
the following conditions: for ti ≤ t < ti+1 it holds that
q(t) < wi , that is, it is required that subcontracting price
across the allocation of job i do not exceed its unit saving
from subcontracting.
We show by a counterexample that it is generally impos-
sible to construct coordinating pricing schemes in the asym-
metric case. Without loss of generality we assume I =
{1, . . . , l} and that the jobs are sequenced in efficient solu-
tions by their index order.
Theorem 7 There exists no coordinating pricing scheme in
the asymmetric valuation case.
Proof To construct coordinating pricing schemes, we must
ensure that agents would not benefit by deviating from the
efficient allocations. In particular, deviations of the similar
type as in Theorem 5 must be unprofitable for any agent
who receives non-zero allocations on the subcontractor’s
machine. That is for every i = 2, . . . , l and every 0 < ǫ < ti
it must hold that,
q (ti − 2ǫ, ti )− q(ti+1 − ǫ, ti+1) ≥ wiǫ. (38)
Consider the following example. There are four jobs
p = (p1 = 6, p2 = 18, p3 = 19, p4 = 25) with w =
(w1 = 9, w2 = 2, w3 = 12, w4 = 11). The unique efficient
allocation is I = {1, 3, 4} with T1 = [0, 3), T3 = [3, 11),
T4 = [11, 18), and O = {2}. For any coordinating pricing
scheme, we must have q(t) > 2 for 0 ≤ t < 18 so that job 2
would not be able to choose any interval on subcontractor’s
machine.
The condition in (38) for job i = 4 and ǫ = 0.25 requires
that,
q (10.5, 11)− q(17.75, 18) ≥ 2.75. (39)
Considering that we need q(t) > 2 for 0 ≤ t < 18, it must
be that q(17.75, 18) > 0.5 and consequently q (10.5, 11) >
3.25.
The condition in (38) for job i = 3 and ǫ = 0.5 requires
that,
q (2, 3)− q(10.5, 11) ≥ 6. (40)
We already know that q (10.5, 11) > 3.25 thus it must be
that q (2, 3) > 9.25. This implies that in the cheapest coor-
dinating pricing scheme, agent 1 must pay 9.25 for acquiring
the time interval [2, 3) on subcontractor’smachine.However,
since the valuation of agent 1 is only 9, this means that he
would be better off by not accepting that interval. This contra-
dicts the fact that q is coordinating. Therefore, in situations
with asymmetric valuations, coordinating pricing schemes
may be impossible to find. ⊓⊔
7 Final remarks and conclusions
We studied the decentralized subcontractor scheduling prob-
lem under complete and private information. We designed
the coordinating pricing schemes in case of complete infor-
mation and studied the range of subcontractor’s revenue for
these schemes. Our coordinating pricing schemes are piece-
wise linear and non-increasing.
We also devised amechanism that is incentive compatible,
individually rational, and efficient in case of private informa-
tion. The mechanism is based on the pivotal mechanism and
it is moreover coordinating. Another desirable property of
the mechanism, that immediately follows from Theorem 6,
is Envy-Freeness (Foley 1967) which is defined as the con-
dition where no agent prefers another agent’s allocation to
its own, that is ui (Ti (p)) ≥ ui (T j (p)) for all j and all i .
The mechanism produces the highest subcontractor revenue
among efficient, incentive compatible, and individually ratio-
nal mechanisms.
For the asymmetric case, we showed that the coordination
through pricing schemes is not always possible.
An open problem is the complexity of finding the efficient
allocations for the asymmetric case.
Several other extensions are possible for this problem:
job’s release dates and due dates, setup times required for
subcontractor to prepare for processing different jobs, and
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transportation costs for transportation from and to manu-
facturers. Finally, the divisibility of jobs can be altered by
requesting that only certain parts of jobs with fixed dura-
tions can be subcontracted. We leave these issues for future
research.
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